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Additional authorities in behalf of Respondents as further authority for POINT I 
Since the filing of respondents Brief the First District Appellant Court 
of Illinois has rendered a decision further interpreting the case of Montgomery v. 
Michaels, 54 111. 2d 5S2, 301 N. E. 2d 465, which case was cited by the appellant 
as authority. The recent decision is entitled Helen H. Elliott v. Olympia Alexson. 
(This decision was rendered late in December, 1975, and is not reported, but it 
was a decision of the First District Appellant Court of Illinois, Appellant No. 61448.) 
In this case Justice Simon, speaking for the Court, states: 
"The petitioner attacks these conclusions urging that they are 
inconsistent with the holding in Montgomery which she contends 
established the rule that an inter vivos trust cannot deprive a 
surviving spouse of her statutory share in the property of the 
deceased spouse. This argument requires us to review 
Montgomery . . . involving the validity of inter vivos trusts . . . 
We read Montgomery to relate only to Totten Trusts, and not 
to other types of inter vivos trusts. The court emphasized that 
a Totten Trust is distinguishable from other trusts because of the 
complete control over the bank account exercised by the depositor, 
and that is the reason for the holding that such a trust should not 
be effective to cut out the distributive share of a surviving spouse. 
Since the trusts in which petitioner seeks to share are not Totten 
Trusts, petitioner's reliance on Montgomery is misplaced. . . . 
The petitioner's theory that the trusts are testamentary in 
character and illusory and, therefore, invalid because of the 
reservation by the settlor of the power to convey is not supported 
by the decisions of Illinois courts. Even in Montgomery, the 
court relying on Holmes v. Mims (1953), 1 IlL 2d 274, 279, 
115 N. E. 2d 790, acknowledged that 'one may dispose of his 
property during his lifetime and thus deprive a spouse of his, or her, 
statutory share, so long as the disposition was sufficiently effective 
and complete, unless the transaction is illusory or tantamount to 
fraud. r The petitioner does not allege, and offers no proof of fraud; 
Additional authority-page 16. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\./tU>t? 1NU, JLriLOI 
Additional authorit ies in behalf of Respondents as further authority for POINT I 
she alleges only that the t rus t s a re i l lusory, The possibil i ty of 
destructibil i ty of the in te res t of a beneficiary does not negate 
the existence of a valid t rus t . (Montgomery v. Michaels (1973), 
54 111. 2d 532, 301 N. E. 2d 465; Fa rkas v. Williams (1955), 
5 111, 2d 417, 125 N . E . 2d 600; In r e Estate of Taggart (1973), 
.15 111. App. 3d 1079,. 1083, 305 N.E.~2d 301,) In Gurnett v. 
Mutual Life Insurance Company(1934), 355 111. 612, 622, 191 N . E . 250, 
the court answered the pet i t ioner ' s contention by stating: 
'The reserva t ion of the power to revoke an ent i re t rus t 
does not invalidate the agreement present ly creat ing it o r 
render it testamentary, (citing eases)* ' 
The t rus t s established by the decedent were not i l lusory or for his 
benefit. On the cont ra ry , they were effective and complete and Tvtt\ 
Ell iot t ' s joint in te res t in ' them as a joint tenant with the respondent 
passed to her upon his death , ! ' 
Respectfully submitted, •'. 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
Attorney for Respondents 
• 75 North Center 
Americ ain Fork , Utah 84003 
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